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JOINT TENANCY IN WASHINGTON BANK ACCOUNTS
IVAN C. RUTLEDGE*A PROMISE to repay money upon demand may be made to the
lender or to more than one promisee. The lender may be said
to be the owner of the promise or the chose in action, but the fact
that there are two or more promisees does not make them joint
promisees or joint owners of the chose in action. Although the debtor
is liable only for the total amount he promises to pay, the promisees
are severally entitled to payment, if the promise is to pay either of
them.' When the promisees are named as depositors and the debtor
is a bank, recent legislation provides that the deposit is "the property
of such persons as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. '' 2 Prior
legislation had made similar provision for mutual savings banks' and
savings and loan associations." This 1951 statute covers national and
state banks, trust companies, and all banking institutions subject to
the state supervisor of banking. It applies to both savings and com-
mercial accounts. What is this statutory creature, the deposit owned
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship?
Absent statutory provision, a contract creating a bank account pay-
able to either of two or more persons, has a very limited effect in
Washington. The right to be paid conferred by the contract is not
the same as ownership of the obligation to pay, and is not a power to
obtain title to the funds realized by drawing on the account. If A
deposits his funds and the bank agrees to pay A or B, although B
has the power to reduce the balance or liquidate the account, he has
no other interest in the account and no interest, except possession,
in the funds realized from the reduction of the credit.' The only effects
of the contract are to alter the form of A's assets into a bank credit
and to give B the power to reduce or exhaust that credit. The bank
credit belongs to the one who furnished the consideration for it, even
if the contract with the bank entitles another to draw upon that credit.
*Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 128 (1932).
2 Wash. Laws 1951, c. 18, p. 36, approved February 19, 1951.
3 REM. Rsv. STAT. § 3348 (3) [P. P. C. § 316-45] ; Wash. Laws 1915, p. 568, reen-
acted Wash. Laws 1929, p. 280.
4 REM. REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 3717-159 [P. P. C. 45 § 453-29]; Wash. Laws
1933, p. 729; Wash. Laws 1945, p. 671.
5 Myers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913); Wolfe v. Hoefke, 124
Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1047 (1925) ; Daly v. Pacific Savings and Loan Ass'n, 154 Wash.
249, 282 Pac. 60 (1929).
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Assets used to establish or maintain a bank account may be owned
severally, or by tenancy in common, or as community property. In
Washington, tenancy by the entireties is superseded by the community
property system, and joint tenancy has in practical effect been con-
verted into tenancy in common by the statutory provision that "if
partition be not made between joint tenants, the parts of those who die
first shall . . . descend, or pass by devise, and shall be subject to
debts... and be considered, to every intent and purpose, in the same
view as if such deceased joint tenants had been tenants in common,
provided, that community property shall not be affected by this act."'
Thus, if the contract with the bank creates a chose in action owned in
the same way as the funds used to purchase it, bank credits may be
severally owned, or they may be assets owned in common, or they may
be community assets. The agreement of the bank to pay any person
named as depositor does not alter the ownership of the credit. If such
a person did not furnish any of the consideration for the obligation
of the bank, he might be considered merely an agent of the owner
to collect from the bank.
An act of 1917 applicable to national banks, state banks, and trust
companies provides for the bank to pay either of two or more persons,
named as depositors, even after the death of one of them, where the
deposit was in their names as depositors and payable to any of them."
A 1915 statute makes similar provision for mutual savings banks,
where the deposit is made in the name of the depositor and another
person, and in form to be paid to either or the survivor of them." The
effective language is quoted below, italicizing the terms of the 1915
act that are not repeated in the 1917 act, and bracketing the additional
terms in the 1917 act:
S.. may be paid to either during the lifetime of both or to the survivor
after the death of one of them [any of said persons, whether the other
be living or not], and such payment and the receipt or acquittance of the
one to whom such payment is made [persons so paid] shall be a valid and
sufficient release and discharge to such savings bank for all payments made
on account of such deposit prior to the receipt by such savings bank of
notice in writing not to pay such deposit in accordance 'with the terms
thereof [of such corporation for any payment so made].
Thus the "agent for collection" is by statute given power to collect
even after the death of the real depositor, the one who purchased the
6 RE. REv. STAT. § 1344 [P. P. C. § 681-1].7 REm. RE V. STAT. § 3249 [P. P. C. § 309-59]; Wash. Laws 1917, p. 293.
8 See note 3 supra.
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bank credit. But the 1917 statute did not confer upon him any interest
in the chose in action other than the power to collect.'
The 1915 mutual savings bank statute, however, goes further in
giving rights to the survivor. And similar language is employed in the
1951 act1" applicable to savings and commercial deposits in national
and state banks, trust companies, and all banking institutions subject
to the state supervisor of banking. The italics below show language
in the 1915 act not repeated in the 1951 act, and the brackets show
new language in the 1951 act:
* . . The making of the [such] deposit in such form shall, in the absence
of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or
proceeding to which either such savings bank or the surviving depositor
is a party, of the intention of both depositors to vest title to such deposit
and the additions thereto in such survivor.
Thus the common law rule that the ownership of an asset is not changed
by the contract of deposit with a bank, converting the asset into a
bank credit, has been altered. If the contract names two persons as
depositors and makes the obligation payable to either or survivor, a
survivorship interest is created. The 1915 mutual savings bank statute
was applied in Winner v. Carroll.1 In that case Winner opened two
accounts by transfer of his credit from other accounts. The contract
made the accounts payable to Winner or Carroll or the survivor. Car-
roll did not contribute to them, but after Winner's death closed them
and did not account for the proceeds to anyone. Winner's brother sued
Carroll. The court held that under the statute Carroll had the right
to the balance at Winner's death. Thus the statute not only protects
the bank in its payment of the survivor according to the terms of the
contract, but invests the contract with an effective intent to give the
survivor complete ownership of the balance at the death of the first
decedent. This case should be determinative of the effect of the parallel
1951 statute.
These statutes contain further language in conjunction with the
language quoted above, which seems to alter the common law rule even
further. This language is quoted below, using italics for terms exclu-
sively 1915, and brackets for 1951:
* . . such deposit and any additions thereto made by either of such persons
after the making thereof, shall become the property of such persons as
9 In re Ivers, 4 Wn.(2d) 477, 104 P.(2d) 467 (1940).
10 See note 2 supra.
11169 Wash. 208, 13 P.(2d) 450 (1932).
JOINT TENANCY IN BANK ACCOUNTS
joint tenants [with the right of survivorship], and the same, together
with all dividends thereon [interest thereof, in the case of savings accounts],
shall be held for the exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to either
during the lifetime of both or to the survivor after the death of one of
them....
What is the significance of providing that the prescribed form of
deposit (making the account payable to either or survivor) creates a
joint tenancy of the account? It would seem to mean, for example,
that if A makes the deposit in the names of A and B, payable to A or B
or survivor, the contract with the bank not only gives B the right to
payment of the account but constitutes an assignment to B of an
interest as joint tenant of the obligation of the bank. Similarly, if A
deposits funds of the community of A and W, his wife, naming A and
B as depositors, B would obtain the same interest. Or if A deposits
funds contributed by A, C, and D, naming A and B as depositors, B
would obtain the same interest. The interest of B as joint tenant with
A is equal to that of A. If B assigns his half-interest in the account to
X, does X become a tenant in common of it, thus defeating survivor-
ship, or does the statutory provision of survivorship still apply? To put
it another way, if B then survives A and terminates the account, must
he respond to a claim by X for half the funds so realized? Or, if A sur-
vives B, does the inter vivos assignment to X cut down A's survivorship
rights to half of the balance at the death of B? If the statutory pro-
vision for survivorship, which is dependent upon the form of the con-
tract with the bank, is controlling, then one of the rights of a joint
tenant, that of severance, is missing.
Another question arises concerning the provision that the persons
named as depositors are joint tenants. The form of the contract, and
the acquittance provisions protecting the bank, confer upon either
of the tenants the power to reduce the chose in action to possession
by drawing on the account. If the exercise of this power be regarded
as analogous to ouster of the other co-tenant, it is inconsistent with
his rights of partition, an incident of co-tenancy at common law. Per-
haps the solution here is to regard the funds so realized as held for
both tenants, where they are in excess of half of the balance in the
account.
If choses in action are considered as subjects of property and capable
of being held in joint tenancy, it would appear that by its contract the
bank conveys the chose to the persons named as depositors, thus con-
ferring upon the tenancy unity of time and title. If the tenancy is a
VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
true joint tenancy, the requisite unity of interest would result by the
terms of the statute. The several rights to payment, however, cast
some doubt upon the unity of possession. Moreover, a question as to
the unities of time and title is presented when the name of a new
depositor is added to an account. This occurred in Nelson v. Olympia
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n.1 This case involved the application
of the savings and loan association statute enacted in 1933."' Larson
opened the account in his own name in 1924. Deposits and interest were
added for ten years. In 1934 he changed the account to Larson or
Nelson, executing an instrument that recited "... this is now a joint
account, withdrawable by either party, regardless of death or disability
of the other party." Larson died. The court said that they had been
joint tenants, and held that Nelson was entitled to the balance as
against Larson's administrator, following the Winner case. 4 Since
the 1933 act was not retroactive," it must be assumed that the 1934
account was treated as an entirely new obligation of the bank. How-
ever, since there was probably no new consideration, the result seems
strained. If the obligation of 1924 be regarded as continuous, Nelson's
title was derived from a separate conveyance and at a different time.
The suspicion that the persons named as depositors are not true
joint tenants is supported not only by the difficulties outlined above,
but by what the court said in the Winner case: "that a joint tenancy,
once created, is irrevocable; that a deposit in the form prescribed by
the statute raises the presumption of a joint tenancy, but that the pre-
sumption may be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intention if
asserted during the lifetime of both depositors; that after the death
of either depositor the presumption becomes conclusive."' 6 The con-
clusiveness of the presumption after the death of a depositor, when
taken with the holding that the survivor is entitled to the balance at
death, seems to mean no more than the right of survivorship in that
balance, without reference to the inter vivos interests in the account.
Likewise, the statement that the joint tenancy, once created, is irre-
vocable, seems to mean that as to the balance at the death of the first
decedent the tenancy, unlike a common law joint tenancy, cannot be
12 193 Wash. 222, 74 P.(2d) 477 (1938).
13 See note 4 supra.
14 See note 11 supra.
15Tacoma Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Nadham, 14 Wn. (2d) 576, 128 P. (2d) 982
(1942).
16 169 Wash. 208, 216-217, 13 P.(2d) 450, 453 (1932). The quotation is a summary
of the majority and concurring opinions in Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167
N. E. 506, 66 A. L. R. 870 (1929), which the court approved.
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converted into a tenancy in common; or .the right of the survivor
cannot be defeated by the assignment of an interest in the account.
That is, the statute creates a right of survivorship in the balance upon
survival, but because it cannot be defeated by assignment, the preced-
ing "estate" is not a joint tenancy in the common law sense, there
being no rights of severance. Further, a deposit in the form prescribed
by the statute raises only a presumption of whatever kind of joint
tenancy there is.
Thus it is clear that the statutes create a right of survivorship
arising from the form of the contract with the bank. It has been held
that for purposes of taxation this right arises at the time that contract
is made, and not at the death of the first decedent.' That case goes
upon the theory that each of the two tenants has a complete interest
in the whole of the account, and upon the death of one of them the
other obtains no new interest. In fact, all of the foregoing cases
involving a question as to the application of these statutes refer to
the interest of the persons named as depositors as .a joint tenancy,
and consider these statutes as qualifying the statute that abolishes
survivorship as an incident of joint tenancy."8 One case'9 even uses
that statute to decide that the form of the contract with a savings and
loan association, prior to the 1933 savings and loan statute, does not
determine the rights of the persons named as depositors, instead of
using the well established common law rule.2" However, in all of these
cases the only question raised was as to the balance at the death of
the first decedent. In none of them did the court have to deal with the
question of inter vivos withdrawals.
Munson v. Haye2 was a case of the application of the 1933 savings
and loan statute to inter vivos withdrawals. Mrs. Munson deposited
community funds with a savings and loan association, under a share
purchase agreement naming Mrs. Munson and her husband as joint
holders. Mrs. Munson subsequently terminated the account and estab-
lished a new one in the names of herself and Haye, on the basis of an
instrument signed by her, which directed the association to pay Haye
the entire balance including interest. Mrs. Munson died, survived by
her husband, who claimed the fund as executor. Haye had terminated
the new account and established one for the same amount in her own
17 In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P. (2d) 45 (1935).
"s See note 3 supra.
29 See note 15 supra.
20 See cases cited in note 5 supra.
2129 Wn.(2d) 733, 189 P.(2d) 464 (1948).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
name exclusively, after the death of Mrs. Munson. The statute at that
time provided:
Two or more persons may jointly become members in an association and
such persons shall enjoy the same rights as though the shares had been
issued to an individual member and unless written instructions to the
contrary are given . . . any of such persons may exercise the rights of
ownership, transfer and withdrawal incidental to such ownership without
the other joint holders joining therein, and in the event of death, the
survivor or survivors may exercise all rights incidents to such stock. ... 22
In the Nelson case2 1 the court held that this statute provides for sur-
vivorship in savings and loan accounts as does the 1915 statute for
mutual savings accounts, and said that the parties are joint tenants.
Nevertheless, Mr. Munson, as executor of the estate of Mrs. Munson,
won. When Mr. and Mrs. Munson jointly became members in the
association, any presumption that they were joint tenants would be
destroyed by the fact that community funds were deposited. "Clear,
certain, and convincing" evidence would be required to establish that
they "intended to change the status of community property by giving
to either the right to appropriate all or any part of the account to his
or her own use and to divest the other of all interest in the part so
appropriated." As previously pointed out, such a right would itself be
inconsistent with the rights of the other joint tenant at common law, if
its exercise is regarded as analogous to an ouster. So far as this case
goes, the holding is in line with the older authority that the contract
with a bank or savings institution does not determine the rights of the
parties in the account. Although the statute alters that rule as to the
balance at the death of the first decedent, it creates no more than a
presumption as to the balance as of any previous time. This presump-
tion is rebutted by showing where the funds came from. The account
has the same status as the funds used to create it.
If the same rule is applicable alike to community funds, separate
funds and funds owned in common, the so-called "joint account"
statutes2 4 do not authorize the creation of a joint tenancy as at common
law but only a right of survivorship and a presumption that the account
is owned in equal shares. This right of survivorship is the right to the
balance existing at the death of the first decedent. This presumption is
22 See note 4 supra.
23 See note 12 supra.
24 See notees 2, 3, and 4 supra. The current savings and loan statute, enacted in 1945.
specifically states that the parties are joint tenants with right of survivorship, in ac-
cordance with the Nelson case, note 12 supra. The Munson court said that the change
in language is immaterial.
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rebuttable and is applicable only to inter vivos withdrawals. The pre-
sumption is rebutted by showing the source of the credit with the bank
or savings institution. Thus in effect the contract with the bank or
savings institution creates a right of survivorship as a matter of prop-
erty ("conclusive evidence" of intent to vest title in the survivor) and
a rule of construction as to inter vivos rights. But the rule of property
as to inter vivos rights remains as before the statutes: the contract of
deposit does not operate as a gift of any interest in the account to the
co-depositor other than the right to draw on the account.
If the interest in the account cannot be assigned by one of the parties
in such a way as to convert the "joint tenancy" into a tenancy in com-
mon, and if the power of either party to liquidate the account is
equivalent to ouster of a co-tenant, the joint tenancy created by these
statutes is not a common law joint tenancy,2" and the statute abolishing
survivorship as an incident thereof is unaffected by the commercial and
savings account statutes. Nor is it essential to the right of survivorship
that there be a joint tenancy. 6
Assuming that the statutes authorize only the creation of a right of
survivorship and presumption of inter vivos ownership in equal shares,
there is not a reintroduction of the doctrine of survivorship as an inci-
dent of joint tenancy to the extent that commercial and savings deposits
are involved, but there may be posed a question of policy in connection
with the statute of frauds and the statute of wills. Is a contract with a
bank or savings institution, authorizing payment to either of several
persons, adequate memorial of intent to vest in them equal ownership of
the credit in the absence of other evidence? The question is unimpor-
tant because of the probability that evidence of the source of the credit
would be forthcoming. Is such a contract authorizing payment to the
survivor of the balance at the death of one of the parties sufficient
memorial of intent to vest in him the ownership of that balance? The
ease of earlier withdrawal and termination of the account makes the
right of the survivor very ambulatory. The court has viewed the crea-
tion of similar contractual rights as testamentary and required the
formalities of a will." But the legislature has by these statutes resolved
5 "This right [to make withdrawals] violates the essential character of a joint
tenancy or an estate by the entirety. The estate created by these deposits was at most
analagous to a joint tenancy, and was not a joint tenancy in the accurate meaning of
these words." Marble v. Treasurer, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N. E. 442, 443 (1923).20 Burns v. Nolette, 83 N. H. 489, 144 Atl. 848, 67 A. L. R. 1051 (1929).
27 Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939); 14 WAsH. L. Ray.
312 (1939).
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the question in favor of the contract with the bank or savings institu-
tion. Their aim, in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, is "not to cramp
intention, but to give it power to prevail."2
28 Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506, 512, 66 A. L. R. 870 (1929).
